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Quantum key distribution protocols constitute an important part of quantum cryptography, where
the security of sensitive information arises from the laws of physics. In this paper we introduce a
new family of key distribution protocols and we compare its key with the well-known protocols such
as BB84, PBC0 and generation rate to the well-known protocols such as BB84, PBC0 and R04. We
also state the security analysis of these protocols based on the entanglement distillation and CSS
codes techniques.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography is a blooming field of scientific
research, where quantum phenomena are applied to se-
curing sensitive information. Usually, cryptographic sys-
tems are based on the key distribution mechanisms and
security of the systems depend on computational com-
plexity. The security of quantum cryptography arises
from the laws of quantum physics. Thus, quantum cryp-
tography does not impose limitation on the eavesdrop-
per’s technology, which is limited by the laws that no
one can ever overcome. Scenarios of quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) protocols are based on the assumption
that secret key is shared by Alice and Bob, and only a
small amount of information can be leaked to an eaves-
dropper Eve. The first QKD protocol, BB84 [1], became
a motivation for expanding research in this area. As a
consequence, Mayers in [2] proved the unconditional se-
curity of this protocol on a noisy channel against a gen-
eral attack. Quantum entanglement and the violation of
Bell’s theorem was introduced to the BB84 protocol by
Ekert [3]. Next, Bennett proposed a simple protocol B92
[4] based on two nonorthogonal states. Unconditional se-
curity analysis of this protocol was performed by Tamaki
et al. in [5, 6] and by Quan et al. in [7]. Generalization
of BB84 protocol using conjugate bases, i.e. six states
was discussed by Bruß[8]. Subsequently, Phoenix et al.
[9] introduced PBC00 protocol and they showed that key
bits can be generated more efficiently by the usage of
three mutually non-orthogonal states. Renes developed
the key creation protocols R04 [10] for two qubit-based
spherical codes, which is a modified version of the PBC00
protocol. The R04 protocol allows one to use all con-
clusive events for key extraction. In [11], Boileau et al.
proved the unconditional security of the trine spherical
code QKD protocol, which concerns also to PBC00 and
R04 protocols. The experimental realization of PBC00
∗Corresponding author, E-mail: lpawela@iitis.pl
and R04 protocols were proposed in [12] and [13]. New
results referring to asymptotic analysis of three-state pro-
tocol can be found in [14]. Scarani et al. [15] introduced
a protocol SARG04, which is resistant to photon number
splitting attacks. QKD protocols have become a subject
of profound research and various unconditional security
analysis of QKD protocol can be found in [16–20], while
for a review see [21].
In this paper we propose a new class of QKD proto-
cols with security analysis performed by the use of tech-
niques similar as in [5, 11]. It means that the proposed
protocol was considered as entanglement distillation pro-
tocol (EDP) [22, 23]. Subsequently, similarly as in case
of BB84 [24], CSS codes [25, 26] were used to the security
proof.
II. K-STATE PROTOCOL
Let us introduce a class of QKD protocols, which can
be reducible to the well-known PBC00 protocol [9]. As-
sume that Alice and Bob would like to share N secret
bits bi. Then, the protocol is as follows.
Protocol 1 (P1)
1. Alice and Bob share N pairs of maximally en-
tangled two-qubit states ρAB = |φ−〉〈φ−|, where
|φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉).
2. She chooses K states |ψk〉 = cos(a+θk)|0〉+sin(a+
θk)|1〉, where a ∈ [0, 2pi) is a constant and θk = 2kpiK
for k ∈ {0, ...,K − 1}. The states |ψk〉 are grouped
into pairs Sk = {|ψk〉, |ψk+1 mod K〉}.
3. Subsequently, Alice measures her parts of the states
ρAB using the POVM { 2K |ψ⊥k 〉〈ψ⊥k |}k, where |ψ⊥k 〉
is orthogonal to |ψk〉. Detection of the state |ψ⊥k 〉
after measurement is equivalent to sending a state
|ψk〉 to Bob.
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24. For each bit bi to be encoded, Alice chooses at ran-
dom ri ∈ 0, . . . , k − 1. The choice of ri determines
the encoding base Sri . Thus, the bit value is equal
to bi = k − ri mod K.
5. Alice publicly announces when all of her measure-
ments are done.
6. Bob prepares measurements described by the
POVM { 2K |ψ⊥k 〉〈ψ⊥k |}k and announces when the
measurements are done. Next, Alice sends se-
quences of values ri to Bob. If the i-th Bob’s mea-
surement outcome is |ψ⊥k 〉, then Bob decodes bi = 0
(if k = ri) or bi = 1 (if k = ri − 1 mod K). In
other cases, the events are regarded as inconclu-
sive. These results are discarded.
7. Half of randomly chosen conclusive events are used
in the estimation of a bit error rate. If the bit error
rate is to high, then they abort the protocol.
8. In the end, they use a classical error correction and
privacy amplification protocols.
Notice that for K = 3 and an appropriate choice of a,
the above scenario is equivalent to the PBC00 protocol
[9]. It can also be shown that protocols of this class
achieve the highest key rate for K = 3.
III. POVM ENHANCEMENT
Now we consider a modification of the above protocol.
Steps 1–4 are the same as in the previous protocol.
Protocol 2 (P2)
5′. Alice publicly announces when all her measure-
ments are done and she sends sequences of values
ri to Bob.
6′. For each ri, Bob prepares an unambiguous mea-
surement described by the POVM
{Πri−1,Πri ,Πfill} ={ 1
λ
|ψ⊥ri〉〈ψ⊥ri |,
1
λ
|ψ⊥ri+1 mod K〉〈ψ⊥ri+1 mod K |
1l2 − 1
λ
(|ψ⊥ri〉〈ψ⊥ri |+ |ψ⊥ri+1 mod K〉〈ψ⊥ri+1 mod K |)}
(1)
where λ =
√
2
2
√
cos 4piK + 1+1 = 1+ | cos( 2piK )|. The
value λ is determined as a maximal eigenvalue of
|ψ˜ri〉〈ψ˜ri |+ |ψ˜ri+1 mod K〉〈ψ˜ri+1 mod K |. (2)
If the i-th Bob’s measurement outcome is |ψ⊥k 〉,
then Bob decodes bi = 0 (if k = ri) or bi = 1 (if
k = ri − 1 mod K). In other cases, the events are
regarded as inconclusive. Finally, Alice and Bob
discard results of measurement, which are incon-
clusive.
Steps 7. and 8. are again the same as in the previous
protocol. For K = 3, the characteristics of the proto-
cols P1 and P2 are the same and are equivalent to the
characteristics of the PBC00 protocol.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Similarly to [5, 11, 24], we consider an entangle-
ment distillation protocol (EDP), which can be reduced
to a QKD protocol equivalent to the above scheme.
Firstly, we transform the vectors |ψi〉 by the rotation
operator R(−η), where Ry(θ) =
(
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
)
and
η = arccos(〈ψ1|ψ0〉)/2 + arctan
(
〈ψ0|1〉
〈ψ0|0〉
)
. After this
transformation, we get states |ψ˜i〉 = R(−η)|ψi〉, where
|ψ˜0〉 = cos( piK )|0〉 + sin( piK )|1〉 and |ψ˜1〉 = cos(− piK )|0〉 +
sin(− piK )|1〉. This transformation has no impact on the
protocol, but is important in the security analysis. As-
sume that Alice prepares many pairs of qubits in the
entangled state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉|ψ˜0〉 + |−〉|ψ˜1〉), where
|±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉) and the basis {|+〉, |−〉} will be de-
noted by ±-basis. Next, she randomly chooses a string
of trit values ri and applies Ry(θri) on the second qubit
of every pair. After that, she sends qubits to Bob
through a quantum channel. Alice announces the val-
ues of ri. Next, Bob performs local filtering operations
[27–29] F = 1√
2λ
(
(|ψ˜⊥0 〉 + |ψ˜⊥1 〉)〈0| + (|ψ˜⊥0 〉 − |ψ˜⊥1 〉)〈1|
)
and operation Ry(−θri) on the received qubits. Next,
half of the states are used to determine the number of
bit errors after application of ±-basis measurements by
Alice and Bob. If the number of error is too high, then
the protocol is aborted. Remaining qubits are used to
distill Bell states by an EDP based on CSS codes. Alice
and Bob perform ±-basis measurements on Bell states to
obtain a secret key.
Notice that Ry(θri)|ψ˜j〉 = |ψ˜ri+j mod K〉 and Alice’s
operation related to measurement { 1λ |ψ˜⊥i 〉〈ψ˜⊥i |}i on her
state are equivalent to ±-basis measurement on the state(
1l2 ⊗ Ry(θri)
)|ψ〉. The filtering operations F , rotation
operation Ry(−θri) and ±-basis measurement performed
by Bob can by described by the following POVM
{Ry(θri)F †|+〉〈+|FRy(θri)†,
Ry(θri)F
†|−〉〈−|FRy(θri)†,
Ry(θri)(1l2 − F †F )Ry(θri)†}.
(3)
This measurement is equivalent to the POVM
{Π˜ri−1, Π˜ri , Π˜fill} ={ 1
λ
|ψ˜⊥ri〉〈ψ˜⊥ri |,
1
λ
|ψ˜⊥ri+1 mod K〉〈ψ˜⊥ri+1 mod K |,
1l2 − 1
λ
(|ψ˜⊥ri〉〈ψ˜⊥ri |+ |ψ˜⊥ri+1 mod K〉〈ψ˜⊥ri+1 mod K |)
}
.
(4)
3In [24], Shor and Preskil have shown that if the bound
of estimations of bit and phase error decreases exponen-
tially asN increases, then Eve’s information on secret key
is exponentially small. This approach was used to prove
the unconditional security of the Bennet 1992 protocol,
by Tamaki et al. [5], and the PBC00 and R04 protocols,
by Boileau et al. [11]. These proofs were based on the
usage of reduction to an entanglement distillation proto-
col initialed by a local filtering process. Subsequently, we
will prove the security of the above entanglement distil-
lation protocol in the same manner as in [5, 11, 24].
Assume that {p(i)b }Ni=1 and {p(i)p }Ni=1 are sets of prob-
abilities of a bit error and a phase error respectively on
the i-th pair after Alice and Bob have done the same
measurements on i− 1 previous pairs. Thus p(i)b and p(i)p
depend on previous results. Moreover, we introduce eb
and ep as rates of bit error and phase error in all con-
clusive results respectively. Estimations of bit and phase
error rates will be performed by to use of Azuma’s in-
equality [30] as in [11].
Theorem 1 ([30]). Let {Xi : i = 0, 1, . . . } be a martin-
gale sequence and for each k it holds that |Xk −Xk−1| ≤
ck. Then for all integers N ≥ 0 and real numbers γ ≥ 0
P (|XN −X0| ≥ γ) ≤ 2
− γ2
2
∑N
k=1
c2
k . (5)
Notice that for ck = 1 we get
P (|XN −X0| ≥ γ) ≤ 2−
γ2
2N . (6)
As a result of the Azuma’s inequality, Ceb is exponen-
tially close to ep (Ceb = ep) for particular constant C, if
Cp
(i)
b = p
(i)
p is satisfied for all i. Assume that Eve can
perform any coherent attack E(i) on qubits sent by Alice
such that
∑
iE
(i)†E(i) ≤ 1l. The general equation for the
ith state can be described by a mixed state
ρ(i) =
1
K
K∑
k=0
|φ(i)k 〉〈φ(i)k |, (7)
where
|φ(i)k 〉 = 1lA ⊗
(
FR(−θk)E(i)R(θk)
)|ψ〉. (8)
Let us introduce the notation |Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉|+〉 ±
|−〉|−〉) and |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉|−〉±|−〉|+〉). Since the prob-
ability of sharing by Alice and Bob a Bell state |Φ+〉 is
equal to the probabilities of a bit error p
(i)
b and phase
error p
(i)
p on the i-th respectively, thus
p
(i)
b =
1
Z(i)
(〈Ψ+|ρ(i)|Ψ+〉+ 〈Ψ−Z |ρ(i)|Ψ−〉)
p(i)p =
1
Z(i)
(〈Φ−|ρ(i)|Φ−〉+ 〈Ψ−|ρ(i)|Ψ−〉), (9)
where
Z(i) =
(〈Ψ+|ρ(i)|Ψ+〉+ 〈Ψ−|ρ(i)|Ψ−〉
+ 〈Φ+|ρ(i)|Φ+〉+ 〈Φ−|ρ(i)|Φ−〉). (10)
It can be checked that
C =
p
(i)
p
p
(i)
b
= 1 + |〈ψ1|ψ0〉|2 = 1 + cos2
(2pi
K
)
. (11)
Similarly as in [11], we calculate the key rate S from
the following formula
S = pc(eb)
(
1− h(eb)− h(ep)
)
, (12)
where h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) and pc(eb)
is the probability of a conclusive result. Since Ceb = ep,
we get
S = pc(eb)
(
1− h(eb)− h(Ceb)
)
. (13)
Notice that for a bit value b = 0 we get outcome proba-
bilities
{0, 1λ |〈ψ˜⊥ri+1mod K |ψ˜ri〉|2, 1 − 1λ |〈ψ˜⊥ri+1mod K |ψ˜ri〉|2}
and for b = 1 we get
{ 1λ |〈ψ˜⊥ri |ψ˜ri+1mod K〉|2, 0, 1 − 1λ |〈ψ˜⊥ri |ψ˜ri+1mod K〉|2}.
Hence, it can be checked that |〈ψ˜⊥ri+1mod K |ψ˜ri〉|2 =
|〈ψ˜⊥ri |ψ˜ri+1mod K〉|2 = sin2( 2piK ). Thus, the probability of
a conclusive result, with the assumption that eb = 0, is
equal to
pc(0) =
sin2( 2piK )
1 + | cos( 2piK )|
, (14)
which can be simplified to pc(0) = 2 sin
2( piK ) for k > 3.
Generally, pc can be expressed as
pc(eb) =
sin2( 2piK )
λ(1− 2eb cos2( 2piK ))
, (15)
which was derived in Appendix A. Notice, that forK = 3,
Eq. (15) is reduced to pc(eb) =
1
2−eb , which corresponds
to probability of conclusive results in PBC00 protocol.
In the case of BB84 protocol, bit error rate is equal
to phase error rate. Thus C = 1 and pc(eb) =
1
2 . In
the case of PBC00, C = 54 and pc(eb) =
1
2−eb . From
Eq. (13) we get that eb ≈ 11.0% for BB84 protocol and
eb ≈ 9.81% for PBC00 protocol. It can be checked that
an interesting case is for K = 5, where C = 18 (11 −
√
5)
and eb ≈ 10.5%. Comparison of proposed protocol with
BB84 and PBC00 protocols is shown in Fig. 1. As we
can see, the best key ratio is for K = 5.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced a new class of quan-
tum key distribution protocols. We have also provided
unconditional security analysis of this protocol. We have
shown, that there exists 5-state protocol with reasonably
high key rate for small bit-flip error rates.
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FIG. 1: Comparison of key rates depending on eb for different
setups of the P2 protocol. Notice that for K = 5 we get the
best key rates. For K = 7, these drop below the values of
obtained for K = 3. We also show the key rates of the BB84
protocol for comparison.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Probability of conclusive events
Notice that if Alice performs |ψ⊥i 〉, where |ψi〉 ∈ Sr,
i = r or i = r+ b mod K and Bob chooses |ψ⊥i 〉, then it
corresponds to an error. In the case when Bob chooses
a state which corresponds to Sr but is not orthogonal to
Alice’s state, then Bob can correctly conclude the state
|ψi〉.
Let ng, ne, ni denote the numbers of good conclusive,
error conclusive and inconclusive events respectively. Be-
side that, let nt = ng+ne+ni and thus 1 =
ng
nt
+ nent +
ni
nt
.
Assume that after Alice sent r to Bob, Bob performs
measurement described by POVM
{Πr,Πr+1,Πfill} ={ 1
λ
|ψ⊥r 〉〈ψ⊥r |,
1
λ
|ψ⊥r+1 mod K〉〈ψ⊥r+1 mod K |,
1l2 − 1
λ
(|ψ⊥r 〉〈ψ⊥r |+ |ψ⊥r+1 mod K〉〈ψ⊥r+1 mod K |)
}
.
(A1)
Now, we suppose that b = 0 and Eve simu-
lates a noisy channel, where state |ψr〉〈ψr| evolves
as ρB = (1 − p)|ψr〉〈ψr| + p21l2. Next, Bob per-
forms measurement and receives measurement outcomes
with probabilities {TrΠrρB = p2λ ,TrΠr+1ρB = p2λ +
1−p
λ sin
2( 2piK ),TrΠfillρb = 1− pλ − 1−pλ sin2( 2piK }.
A bit error rate eb is defined as the rate of error in
conclusive results. Hence
eb =
ne
ne + ng
and ne =
eb
1− ebng. (A2)
Notice that error eb can be estimated as
eb =
TrΠr+1ρB
TrΠr+1ρB + Πfillρb
=
p
2(1− p) sin2( 2piK ) + 2p
.
(A3)
Now, let us determine a ratio
D =
TrΠr+1ρB
TrΠfillρB
=
2(1− p) sin2( 2piK ) + p
2λ− 2(1− p) sin2( 2piK )− 2p
=
2(1− eb) sin2( 2piK )
2λ(1− 2eb cos2( 2piK ))− 2 sin2( 2piK )
.
(A4)
From the central limit theorem and the above calcula-
tion we get
ng
nt
=
Dni
nt
+O(). (A5)
Continuing we obtain
1 =
ng
nt
+
ne
nt
+
ni
nt
=
ng
nt
+
eb
1− eb
ng
nt
+
ni
nt
≈ Dni
nt
+
eb
1− eb
Dni
nt
+
ni
nt
≈ D + 1− eb
1− eb
ni
nt
(A6)
and
pc = 1− ni
nt
=
D
D + 1− eb =
sin2( 2piK )
λ(1− 2eb cos2( 2piK ))
. (A7)
